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Introduction 
 
Recently evolutionary economists started to pay attention to ontological issues in their 
own subfield. Two projects dominate the discussions: Generalized Darwinism 
(henceforth: GD), promoted by Geoff Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen, and the 
Continuity Hypothesis (henceforth: CH), put forward by Ulrich Witt. As a first and crude 
approximation (to be refined below), GD entails the view that abstract and general 
Darwinian principles suit the study of biological evolution and of economic evolution 
equally well. The CH entails the view that ongoing economic evolution proceeds on the 
basis of, and is still influenced by the outcomes of preceding processes of biological 
evolution. At present, GD and CH are vying for hegemony in the community of 
evolutionary economists. GD and the CH sometimes are pitted against each other as if 
they were mutually excluding rivals. This paper investigates to what extent (and if so, in 
what sense) GD and the CH are rivals. 
 
As we shall see, part of the debate between proponents of GD and of the CH is about the 
very notion of ontology itself. At stake is whether the views expressed in GD are based 
on ontology rather than analogy. The categorization of ontological issues into three 
clusters that I first presented in Vromen (2004a) is taken here as a framework to organize 
the discussion. Again (as I already did in that paper) I will argue that we should start with 
recognizing not only that quite distinct issues are all deemed ontological in the literature, 
but also that stances taken on an issue in the one cluster often do not prejudge the stance 
that can be consistently taken on an issue in another cluster. For example, taking the 
stance that Darwinian principles are needed to explain economic evolution does not 
commit one to take the extreme and wildly implausible view that our genes fully 
determine our behavior. But I will also discuss a few cases in which the stance taken on 
an issue in the one cluster does narrow down the range of stances that can be consistently 
taken on an issue in another cluster. Thus, while I focused mainly on independencies 
between positions taken in different clusters of ontological issues in Vromen (2004a), in 
this contribution I will discuss independencies and interdependencies between them alike. 
 
This contribution to the Handbook has the character of an overview rather than of an 
ordinary paper in which a specific thesis or claim is argued for. Presenting a fair and 
accurate discussion of the debate and of the several issues that are at stake in it is what I 
aim at. No attempt is made to add something original to these discussions. Insofar as 
there is originality in this contribution it is in the way in which the discussion is 
organized and in the links that are forged with other strands of literature. Connections 
will be made not only with relevant literature in philosophy of science, but occasionally, 
when I thought this informative and useful, also with currents in economic theorizing 
(that do not belong to evolutionary economics) and with currents in evolutionary 
theorizing in other fields and disciplines. 
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Evolutionary economics in a nutshell 
 
Evolutionary economics is understood here quite narrowly as the branch within 
economics that has been developed in the wake of Nelson and Winter’s seminal An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982).2 Other evolutionary economists 
working in this tradition include, among many others,3 Stan Metcalfe, Ulrich Witt, Geoff 
Hodgson, Giovanni Dosi, Kurt Dopfer, Brian Loasby, John Foster, Pier Paolo Saviotti, 
Esben Sloth Anderson, Steve Klepper, Andreas Pyka, Uwe Cantner, Jason Potts, Johann 
Peter Murmann, Thorbjørn Knudsen, Gerald Silverberg, Bart Verspagen, Bart 
Nooteboom and Koen Frenken. Papers written by evolutionary economists often find 
their way into journals like Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, and Structural Change and Economic Dynamics. 
 
There are several features of evolutionary economics distinguishing it from other 
traditions or schools of thought within economics. Two such features stand out: the level 
of analysis in evolutionary economics and the key assumptions in its explanatory 
framework. Evolutionary economics studies processes in which changes (notably 
technological change) are brought about at the (‘population’) level of industries, sectors, 
branches, markets or whole economies where the key players (the ‘agents’) are not 
individual persons but firms or other organizations. Note that this is not at all unlike 
traditional (or standard) neoclassical theory, in which households and firms are also 
treated as if they were unitary agents. Evolutionary economics is also quite like the 
neoclassical theory of the firm in another respect. In the neoclassical theory of the firm, 
firms are looked at from a technological perspective: firms are in fact equated with their 
production function. Evolutionary economics likewise focuses on firm-specific 
capabilities and routines to produce goods or services. The ways in which firm members 
and units are internally organized within firms get considerably less attention. Thus 
evolutionary economics is unlike more recent theories of the firm, in which intra-
organizational issues are put centre stage. In those recent theories the agents figuring in 
the nexus of contracts (which, according to some theory, a firm basically is) or in 
governance structures are individual persons. 
 
This raises the issue whether it is acceptable to treat firms as unitary agents (in the 
explanantia) in explanations, given that it is clear that multi-person firms in fact are not 
unitary agents at all. Multi-person firms house heterogeneous persons with different 
interests, beliefs, intentions, attitudes, perceptions and the like. One need not be a staunch 
defender of methodological individualism to appreciate that the behavior of a firm at least 
partly depends on (the success or failure of) attempts to align all these internal differences 
within firms (Abell, Felin and Foss 2007). One of the hallmarks of evolutionary 
economics is that it acknowledges heterogeneity within industries between firms. But it 
                                                 
2 Which is not to say that evolutionary economists endorse and build upon the foundations Nelson and 
Winter laid for evolutionary economists. As we shall see later on in this paper, the two main protagonists in 
the paper – Hodgson and Knudsen on the one hand and Witt on the other – distance themselves from 
Nelson and Winter (1982) in several respects. 
3 With sincere apologies to those whose names deserve to be mentioned but are not mentioned here. 
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seems to pay considerably less attention to the heterogeneity within firms between firm 
members. 
 
Thus evolutionary economics is not quite unlike the neoclassical theory of the firm qua 
its level of analysis and its technological (rather than organizational) theoretical 
orientation. But qua their key assumptions in their explanatory (or theoretical) framework 
they are very different. (Static) equilibrium analysis is discarded in evolutionary 
economics and so are strong rationality assumptions. Agents are boundedly rational at 
most. They satisfice rather than maximize. What is more, agents, firms in particular, 
differ with respect to their behavioral properties. There is heterogeneity in this respect. 
Thus representative agent type of theorizing is rejected. So is equilibrium theorizing. 
There is no presumption that economies (or industries) are in equilibrium. There is no 
presumption even that economies tend to move in the direction of equilibria. To the 
extent that the notion of equilibrium serves any analytical purpose at all (as a benchmark, 
for example) in models in evolutionary economics, economies may be out-of-equilibrium 
all of the time. And if an economy converges on an equilibrium, it need not stay there for 
long. Both exogenous and endogenous changes may dislodge the equilibrium. Static (or 
comparative-static) equilibrium analysis is replaced by dynamic process-analysis. 
Dynamic process-analysis need not take the form of analytically tractable models that 
allow for close-form solutions. Computer simulations are readily accepted. Attempts are 
made to make room for endogenous technological change (innovations); attempts that are 
taken by some to defy closed system theorizing. 
 
Thus while evolutionary economics shares its level of analysis and technological 
orientation with the neoclassical theory of the firm, it seems their theoretical assumptions 
could not have been more different. In what respects does evolutionary economics 
distinguish itself from other attempts in economics to incorporate evolutionary theorizing 
or insights from evolutionary theorizing elsewhere? Elsewhere (Vromen 2004b) I 
introduced the following typology. I ranked evolutionary economists among the 
revolutionaries, stressing that evolutionary economists plead for a theoretical approach in 
economics that is radically different from the one advocated and followed in ‘orthodox’ 
economics.4 In this they differ from ‘conservatives’ and ‘revisionists’, economists who 
believe that taking evolution seriously in economics entails no changes or only minor 
changes in the standard theoretical approach in economics. Economists stressing that the 
main lesson of evolutionary game theory is that the use of the solution concept of Nash 
equilibrium is vindicated in economics (cf. Mailath 1998) I call conservatives. 
Revisionists include economists who argue on evolutionary grounds that utility functions 
should make room for a taste for fairness, for example, or for altruism (cf. Frank 1988). 
 
In Vromen (2008) I stress that evolutionary economists focus on current ongoing 
processes of economic change, which they take to be evolutionary (in senses yet to be 
clarified) in kind. This is really different from economists who hold, for example, that the 
main service evolutionary theorizing can render to economics is that it helps with 
identifying our basic preferences. I do not only have in mind here economists who want 
                                                 
4 According to evolutionary economists, ‘orthodox’ economics is wedded to the ‘(individual) maximization 
cum (aggregate) equilibrium’ framework. 
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to accommodate the ideas of evolutionary psychology, for example, but also 
bioeconomists and neuroeconomists (Vromen 2007), proponents of the so-called Indirect 
Evolutionary Approach (Güth and Yaari 1991) and protagonists of strong reciprocity 
(Bowles and Gintis 2003) and altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gächter 2002). This latter 
group of economists have processes of biological (and possibly also cultural) evolution in 
mind that took place long time ago (but that allegedly still indirectly influence our current 
behavior – through our basic preferences). They need not (and actually most of the time 
do not) believe that current processes of economic change are evolutionary in any 
meaningful sense. 
 
 
The positions: Generalized Darwinism (GD) and the Continuity Hypothesis (CH) 
 
Above I gave rough characterizations of GD and the CH. GD I described as entailing the 
view that abstract and general principles can be discerned in Darwinian evolutionary 
theory that suit the subject matters both of biology and of economics. The CH I described 
as entailing the view that ongoing economic evolution proceeds on the basis of, and is 
still influenced by the outcomes of preceding processes of biological evolution. In fact, 
both GD and the CH involve not only more substantive claims than the descriptions just 
given suggest, but also specific heuristics for further research. 
 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen’s version of GD 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2006) give more substance to GD by specifying the following 
three abstract and general Darwinian principles: variation, inheritance (or replication) 
and selection.5 Given the centrality of the three principles in their GD, it is remarkable 
how little Hodgson and Knudsen say about what these principles precisely are and what 
they entail. The few things they say about the principles are expressed in a loose way. 
Perhaps Hodgson and Knudsen simply take for granted that everyone knows what the 
principles mean. Anyway, the following can be extracted from their sparse remarks and 
comments about the principles. There is variation in a population of entities if the entities 
differ in relevant respects. There is inheritance (or replication) if there is a mechanism 
seeing to it that the properties are preserved (or retained) either in the units themselves or 
in their ‘offspring’ (to which the properties are passed on). And there is selection if the 
entities are mortal and degradable, if they face an omnipresent problem of scarcity and if 
they are therefore caught in a struggle for existence (Hodgson and Knudsen 2006, 4). 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen argue that in any system in which all three principles are present 
Darwinian evolution occurs. The three principles are present not only in biological 
                                                 
5 The three principles (albeit under slightly different names) were already presented in Darwin (1859). As 
Hodgson and Knudsen note, many scholars earlier noticed that the principles potentially have a wider scope 
than the biological domain (e.g. Lewontin 1970, Campbell 1965, Popper 1972, Hull 1981, Dawkins 1983, 
Plotkin 1994, Cziko 1995, Dennett 1995). 
5
  #0805 
 
 
 
systems, they argue, but also in economic systems.6 Hodgson and Knudsen do not deny 
that biological and economic systems differ in many significant ways, but they argue that 
biological and economic systems have these three principles in common. Again, Hodgson 
and Knudsen do not spend many words on what exactly Darwinian evolution is. But from 
the foregoing it can be gathered that what they mean is evolution through natural 
selection: the degree to which the entities are relatively successful translates into the 
spread or decline of the frequency (or proportion) of their properties in the population. 
The frequency of the properties of relatively successful entities increases in the 
population, while the frequency of the properties of less successful decreases. 
 
GD is given even more substance by Hodgson and Knudsen by arguing (following David 
Hull’s 1982 terminology) that replicators and interactors are identifiable both in 
biological and in economic systems.7 Hull argues that evolution through natural selection 
involves two processes rather than one: replication and interaction. Interaction causes 
replication to be differential. Interactors are the entities that interact with their 
environment and with each other and replicators are the entities that are replicated. More 
precisely, replicators are those entities that pass on their structure intact through 
successive replications (see also Dawkins 1976). Interactors are  those entities that 
interact as cohesive wholes with their environments in such a way as to make replication 
differential.8 Paradigmatic examples of replicators and interactors in the biological 
domain are genes and individual organisms, respectively. Hull’s general rendering of 
evolution through natural selection in terms of interactors and replicators is meant to 
imply that there might be other replicators and interactors than genes and organisms, not 
just within, but possibly also outside the biological domain. Thus evolution through 
natural selection need not be confined to the biological domain. One of the things Hull is 
famous for, for example, is for arguing that there also is evolution through natural 
selection in scientific development (Hull 1988). 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) suggest that in the economic domain habits and routines 
are replicators and firms are interactors. Although they recognize that habits and routines 
are quite different than genes in several respects and that the way in which habits and 
routines are replicated differs from how genes are inherited, Hodgson and Knudsen argue 
that habits and routines meet Hull’s definition of a replicator. And although firms are 
quite unlike individual organisms in many respects, they meet Hull’s definition of an 
interactor. Hence, despite the differences between these economic and biological units, 
Darwinian evolution occurs in both domains. Hodgson and Knudsen also stress, however, 
that the fact that biological and economic evolution are both Darwinian at an abstract and 
general level of description does not imply that biological and economic evolution are 
                                                 
6 Both Hodgon and Knudsen and Witt and his group members assume that economic evolution is a 
subspecies of cultural evolution. They believe that all general properties of cultural evolution are shared by 
economic evolution. 
7 As will be argued in more detail below (see also Vromen 2007), and as Hodgson and Knudsen themselves 
acknowledge, evolution through natural selection can occur without there being replicators. 
8 Hull (2001) argues that he introduced the distinction between replicators and interactors to disambiguate 
the phrase “unit of selection”. Hull also makes clear that he believes that taken together replication and 
interaction are sufficient to characterize evolution by natural selection. Replication and interaction are not 
assumed to also cover other possible evolutionary forces causing evolution such as drift. 
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similar in other respects. They argue that the processes differ profoundly at the less 
abstract and general and more detailed level. 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen argue that explanations of the evolution of a system in which the 
three principles are present cannot be acceptable unless they invoke the three principles: 
“… an adequate explanation of the evolution of such a system must involve the three 
Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection.” (Hodgson and Knudsen 
2006, 5; Italics in the original; see also Hodgson and Knudsen 2008). Yet they also argue 
that explanations that invoke only the three principles are incomplete. If evolutionary 
processes in the economic domain are to be explained, auxiliary domain-specific 
explanations and hypotheses have to be added to the three generalized Darwinian 
principles. Thus Hodgson and Knudsen make a distinction between the three generalized 
Darwinian principles, which are taken to provide a general theoretical framework (also 
sometimes called universal metatheory) that is domain-unspecific, and auxiliary 
explanations and hypotheses, which are taken to be domain-specific details. Details that 
are specific for the economic domain are to be added to the three principles in order to 
get full-fledged causal explanations of economic evolutionary processes. 
 
Thus Hodgson and Knudsen’s case for GD involves not just a description of what 
Generalized Darwinism entails: the three general principles of variation, inheritance (or 
replication) and selection. It also involves the claim that these principles are not only 
applicable to economic evolution (and other forms of non-biological evolution) but are 
necessary in any study of complex evolving population systems. And, finally, it also 
involves a program (or project): more is needed than the application of just the three 
principles to have a satisfactory study of economic evolution. Domain-specific 
hypotheses and data have to be added to arrive at explanatory theories. 
 
 
Witt’s version of the CH 
 
Above I asserted that the CH entails the view that ongoing economic evolution proceeds 
on the basis of, and is still influenced by the outcomes of preceding processes of 
biological evolution. Witt gives more substance to the CH by arguing that psychological 
features of human beings are outcomes of antecedent processes of biological evolution 
that are of special importance to ongoing processes of economic evolution. In particular, 
ancient processes of biological evolution produced both the basic, innate wants and 
primitive, non-cognitive forms of learning (such as conditioning) that still constrain and 
influence the behavior of present-day human beings. On the basis of their basic wants, for 
example, people also learn new acquired wants through conditioning (or associative 
learning). Thus when people regularly consume food in specifically arranged settings that 
have certain aesthetic aspects (furniture, tableware, etc.), for example, they tend to 
acquire a want for such settings even in the absence of eating (Witt 2001). 
 
In virtue of their unique and superior intelligence, however, the behavioral repertoire of 
human beings has been extended vastly beyond these genetically encoded dispositions 
and capacities. People have devised all kinds of sophisticated tools for meeting their 
7
  #0805 
 
 
 
wants, for example. And they have developed refined communication technologies 
enabling them to socially transmit new information and new knowledge rapidly and 
widely. In short, due to processes of cultural evolution people have transcended the state 
their ancestors were in (and that their cousin mammals still are in) when cultural 
evolution took off. Witt stresses that cultural knowledge differs considerably from 
genetically coded knowledge (Witt 2004). 
 
Genetic ‘knowledge’ comes in a form which uno actu interprets, expresses, and 
replicates its meaning in terms of blue prints for manipulating materials and/or 
triggering ad controlling processes, provided the necessary materials and free 
energy are available. Replication occurs with some variation between generations, 
and since genetic novelty originates from those variations, the emergence of 
novelty is a part of the programmed automatism. None of this holds in the case of 
cultural knowledge. The latter is coded and stored in a form lacking an automatic 
copying, interpreting, and self-expressing modus. The generation, storage, 
expression (utilization and application), and even the replication of cultural 
knowledge all need to be effected by human action and require at least a minimal 
form of intelligence. 
(Witt 2004, 138-139) 
 
Witt argues that differences between genetically coded knowledge and cultural 
knowledge like these are so huge that the Darwinian triple of variation, replication and 
selection is unsuitable for studying cultural evolution. The Darwinian tripe fits biological 
but not cultural evolution. Instead, what biological and cultural evolution do have in 
common with each other is that they both deal with processes of self-transformation. 
They both involve the transformation of systems through the emergence and 
dissemination of novelty. The specific ways in which novelty is created and disseminated 
in biological and economic systems differ significantly. The creation of novelty in 
economic systems crucially involve intelligence and intentionality, for example, things 
that are completely lacking in biological evolution. Despite such differences, self-
transformation through the emergence and dissemination of novelty is a generic 
formulation of evolutionary processes that fits both realms. 
 
Witt (2007) argues that the CH is committed to monism and naturalism as specific 
“ontological creeds”. Instead of assuming that the subject matters of evolutionary 
biological and evolutionary economics belong to different, disconnected spheres of 
reality, as non-monistic ontologies do, the CH takes them to be causally connected. The 
CH presumes that there is one and the same ontological basis for all evolutionary 
pheomena (Witt 2004, 129). In particular, the CH is at odds with the most (in)famous and 
tenacious two-tier ontology in history, namely Cartesian dualism. Witt also suggests that 
the CH implies a rejection of the doctrine that the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), to 
which economics belongs, ought to have a different method or approach (Verstehen) than 
the sciences (Naturwissenschaften, which are assumed to be in the business of Erklären). 
Like biology and the other natural sciences, the aim of economics is to explain 
phenomena and processes. 
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The ambitious research program of Witt and his Evolutionary Economics Group 
members in Jena is to build a new consumption theory and a new production theory on 
the basis of the CH.9 The challenge is to develop new theories that can explain historical 
changes and trends in consumption and production patterns better than the rather sterile 
neoclassical consumption and production theories. On the basis of the CH, substantive 
conjectures are made not only about why there has been an explosion of new products 
and services even though many of the basic wants that they ultimately serve are satiable, 
but also about how consumers arrive at the preferences that they have and when, why and 
how preferences change (Witt 2001, 2008). Likewise, the CH can serve as a useful 
starting point for understanding better (than standard economic theory is able to do) how 
human cultural knowledge enables mankind both to steer nature’s production processes 
in desired directions and to create ever new artificial production processes (Witt 2004). 
  
In short, Witt’s CH links ongoing cultural and economic evolution with prior biological 
evolution: prior biological evolution paved the way for, and still defines the constraints 
for ongoing cultural and economic evolution. Where biological and economic 
evolutionary processes meet in particular is in the genetic endowment of humans. The 
genetic endowment of humans is a product of antecedent biological evolution that still  
affects current human consumption and production behavior in various ways (through 
determining innate wants, for example, and programming non-cognitive learning 
processes). Focusing on antecedent processes of biological evolution allows one to 
reconstruct the conditions from which processes of cultural evolution started. And it puts 
what happened subsequently in processes of cultural evolution in the right perspective. 
This is why the CH is believed to be useful as a starting-point for developing new 
consumption and production theories that are better able to explain the enormous changes 
in consumption and production patterns over the last centuries than standard neoclassical 
consumption and production theory. 
 
 
The debate: what is at stake? 
 
Analogy or ontology? 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD has been criticized by the proponents of the CH, not only by 
Witt (2004, 2007) himself, but also by several members of his Evolutionary Economics 
Group at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena (cf. Buenstorf 2006 and Cordes 
2006, 2007). Witt and his collaborators argue that Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD is based 
on a biological analogy. The Darwinian triple was first formulated in the field of 
biological evolutionary theory and was only later transferred to, or taken over by other 
fields. Witt et al. recognize that Hodgson and Knudsen aim at giving a domain-general 
formulation of the Darwinian principles. But Witt et al. deny that Hodgson and Knudsen 
succeed in shaking off features that are specific and peculiar to biological evolution. Even 
                                                 
9 Witt mentions Veblen, Georgescu-Roegen, Gowdy, Faber and Proops and the late Hayek as precursors of 
this ambitious project. 
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in Hodgson and Knudsen’s abstract and general rendering of the three principles, Witt et 
al. argue, the principles betray their origin in evolutionary biology. 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen emphatically deny that their GD is based just on an analogy. They 
have different trump cards on their sleeves here. Hodgson and Knudsen draw attention to 
the fact that Darwin himself hinted at applications of his three principles outside the 
biological domain (for example, to account for the evolution of language). So even 
Darwin already had a wider application of his three principles in mind than just biological 
evolution. Hodgson and Knudsen also note that in developing the three principles Darwin 
was inspired by the work of the political economist Thomas Robert Malthus on natural 
checks on population growth. Thus Hodgson and Knudsen call into question that the 
three Darwinian principles originated from within evolutionary biology. More 
importantly, Hodgson and Knudsen argue that their case for GD is based on the 
observation that biological and economic systems have the three rather abstract properties 
of variation, replication and selection in common. Even if it were the case that the 
Darwinian triple was first formulated in evolutionary biology, this would do nothing to 
either vindicate or invalidate this observation. 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen’s proposal to invoke the Darwinian triple to study cultural (and in 
particular economic) evolution arguably is based on an analogy. If all it takes for some 
idea or concept to be based on an analogy is that a connection involving more or less 
formal similarities is made between different domains of discourse (which is what 
Hodgson himself suggests; see Hodgson 2002, 263), then their proposal is based on an 
analogy. After all, Hodgson and Knudsen did not invent the Darwinian triple themselves, 
but obtain it from Darwin and from Darwinism. The principles of variation, selection (or 
rather, the struggle for existence) and inheritance were first coined by Darwin, not by any 
of his precursors outside biology. But it seems that Hodgson and Knudsen are right in 
insisting that their case for GD is based on an ontological claim. Arguing that biological 
and economic systems have the three rather abstract properties of variation, replication 
and selection in common, as they do, is making an ontological claim. It is a claim about 
properties that different domains in reality (allegedly) have, not about concepts or 
principles in different theories or fields of enquiry. Hodgson and Knudsen also seem to 
be right in arguing that their case rests on the truth of this ontological claim rather than on 
the issue of whether or not the Darwinian triple first was formulated in evolutionary 
biology. 
 
“Analogy or ontology” seems to be a false opposition here. Hodgson and Knudsen’s case 
for GD is based on both analogy and ontology. Their Darwinian triple is an abstracted 
and generalized version of theories developed in another field of enquiry. Yet their 
assertion that the triple suits cultural (and more in particular economic) evolution is based 
on their ontological assessment that complex evolving cultural systems have the required 
properties for evolution through natural selection to occur. Those who reject Hodgson 
and Knudsen’s GD also do so on ontological grounds. They believe that Hodgson and 
Knudsen’s Darwinian triple do not fit the specific characteristics of evolving economic 
systems. In this respect, the objections of Witt et al. against Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD 
are reminiscent of the objections earlier opponents of “the biological metaphor (or 
10
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analogy) raised (Foster 1997; Witt 1999). These earlier opponents likewise argued that 
the biological metaphor is ill-suited to do justice to the specificities of economic 
evolution. 
 
Different sorts of ontological issues are at stake 
 
In Vromen (2004a) I argued that the ontological claim made here belongs to a first cluster 
of ontological issues. If we confine our attention to biological and economic evolution, 
what is at stake in this first cluster is whether processes of biological and economic 
evolution have common properties. If so, it is possible to formulate a general (or generic) 
description of both processes by referring to the common properties. This is exactly what 
Hodgson and Knudsen aim to do with their GD. Witt et al. argue that Hodgson and 
Knudsen fail in their attempt because variation, replication and selection are properties of 
biological evolution but not of economic evolution. Witt et al. do not deny that processes 
of biological and economic evolution have common properties, however. Both processes 
are argued to involve the emergence and dissemination of novelty.10 What this means is 
that strictly speaking Witt’s generic description of evolution in terms of self-
transformation rather than his CH is the real competitor of Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD 
(as Witt 2003 himself recognizes). It is Witt’s description of evolution in terms of self-
transformation that is meant to be rivaling Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD in giving a 
domain-unspecific description of evolutionary processes, based on different (allegedly) 
common properties of evolutionary processes in different domains in reality. 
 
Witt’s CH is not meant to give a generic description of evolutionary processes based on 
properties that evolutionary processes in different domains (allegedly) have in common. 
Instead, it is meant to describe how evolutionary processes in different domains (notably 
evolution in biology and evolution in culture) are causally connected to one another.11 
The issue that the CH addresses belongs to a different, second cluster of issues (Vromen 
2004a). At stake in this second cluster is not whether or not biological and economic 
evolution have common properties (and, if so, what are these properties), but whether or 
not biological and economic evolution interact causally with each other (and, if so, how). 
Witt’s CH asserts, as we saw above, that products of antecedent processes of biological 
evolution prepared the ground for, and still determine the constraints for, subsequent 
processes of cultural evolution. It is assumed that biological selection pressures on 
humans have faded away. Hence no systematic feedback effects of cultural evolution on 
biological evolution are envisaged. This reflects one particular view on how biological 
and economic evolution interact. There are others. An example is gene-culture co-
evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985), which assumes that the causal interaction between 
biological and cultural evolution is a two-way rather than a one-way street. It is not just 
that products of biological evolution affect ongoing cultural evolution, as is recognized in 
                                                 
10 Witt (personal correspondence) stresses that both the emergence and the dissemination of novelty capture 
more than the emergence of new variants and selective retention processes respectively.  
11 As Witt correctly notes, we can say that evolutionary processes in all domains have particular properties 
in common without saying anything about how (if at all) they are causally connected (Witt 2003, 282). 
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Witt’s CH, it is also possible that products of cultural evolution affect ongoing biological 
evolution.12
 
Note that it is presupposed in both Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH that 
biological and economic evolution are distinct processes. Only if biological and 
economic evolution are distinct processes we can ask whether they have common 
properties. And only of distinct processes we can ask whether they causally interact with 
each other. All parties mentioned thus far (not just Hodgson and Knudsen and Witt et al., 
but also Boyd and Richerson) agree that biological and cultural evolution mutually 
exclude each other in that either genes (or possibly other biological units of replication) 
or that ideas, tunes, habits, routines (or possibly yet other cultural units) are transmitted 
from the one individual (or possibly a unit at a different level of organization, such as a 
firm) to another. All parties agree that the social transmission of cultural units does not 
involve the transmission of genes. The parties might disagree on many other issues, but 
they agree that the fact that non-biological entities are transmitted makes biological and 
cultural evolution two distinct, non-overlapping processes. 
 
In fact, Hodgson and Knudsen on the one hand and Witt et al. on the other agree on many 
more things. Witt (2007) argues that his CH and Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD find 
common ground also in their endorsement of monism.13 And, indeed, Hodgson’s (2004) 
discussion of a layered ontology indicates that here too Witt and Hodgson are in basic 
agreement.14 Instead of assuming that reality is partitioned into two (or more) separate, 
disconnected spheres, the notion of a layered ontology suggests that the whole of reality 
is ultimately or in essence one. The notion of a layered ontology implies that adjacent 
layers (or levels) of organization exist in reality. Adjacent layers are assumed to be 
connected to each other as wholes are related to their parts, so that all layers are related 
ultimately with the layer that is addressed by elementary particles physics. Firms are 
composed of individual human beings, human beings are composed of their organs (such 
as their brains), organs are composed of their cells (such as neurons), cells are composed 
of their molecules (such as genes) and so on, all the way down to elementary subatomic 
particles.15 Hodgson argues that at higher levels there are emergent properties, properties 
that are absent at lower levels and that cannot be fully reduced to lower-level entities and 
their properties. Witt (2007) likewise argues that he endorses a non-reductionist monism. 
 
                                                 
12 Christian Cordes seems to be subscribe to Boyd and Richerson’s gene-culture co-evolutionary theory 
rather than to Witt’s one-directional view on the causal relation between biological and economic 
evolution. 
13 Witt seems to conflate ontological monism with methodological monism, however, when he argues that 
both the humanities and the sciences should aim at giving causal explanations of phenomena. Ontological 
monism does not imply such methodological monism (cf. Dennett’s defense of taking the intentional 
stance). 
14 Hodgson (2002) calls evolution a multi-level process, suggesting that biological and economic evolution 
occur at different levels. 
15 This is not to suggest that the ways in which the components are organized (or arranged, or connected) 
may (and, indeed, presumably does) does not matter. Their organization surely do matter (cf. Vromen 
2006). 
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Issues like these belong to yet another, third cluster. At stake here is what is the basic 
furniture of the world. The issues belonging to the third cluster can be called 
metaphysical issues. That metaphysical issues are different in kind than the issues 
belonging to the second cluster can be nicely illustrated with the example of 
intentionality. The issue of how the capacity of intentionality evolved in the past (which 
belongs to the second cluster) differs from the issue of what (if any) is the material basis 
of the capacity of intentionality (which belongs to the third cluster). In both cases we can 
talk of the emergence of the capacity of intentionality, but the meaning of ‘emergence’ is 
different in each case. If we talk of the evolutionary origin of the capacity, we have a 
causal, diachronic sense of ‘emergence’ in mind. If we talk of the material basis of the 
capacity, we have a constitutive, synchronic sense of ‘emergence’ in mind (Bedau 1997; 
Craver 2007). Similarly, if we look at the how economic and biological phenomena relate 
to each other from the metaphysical perspective of the third cluster, their connection is 
not causal, but constitutive. 
 
Biological phenomena or the biological domain and economic phenomena and the 
economic domain are not seen here as mutually exclusive, which, as we saw, is 
presupposed by the adversaries Hodgson and Knudsen and Witt et al. alike, but rather as 
inclusive. Biological phenomena, pertaining to the levels of organs, cells and molecules, 
appear as parts of the phenomena that economists address, which typically are the higher 
levels of firms, industries, markets and whole economies. 
 
Different sorts of ontological issues also surround the routines of firms. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) introduced routines as analogous both to the skills of individual persons 
and to the genes of organisms. Routines are characterized by Nelson and Winter as 
involving automatic rather than conscious, deliberate option selection, just as is the case 
with the exercise of skills, and as being durable or inert, just like genes. We saw that 
Hodgson and Knudsen likewise argue that routines are replicators in the economic 
domain, just as genes are paradigm cases of replicators in the biological domain. As will 
be spelled out in more detail below, Witt et al. disagree. The issue at stake here is one 
belonging to the first cluster: are there long-lived routines in the economic domain, and if 
so, do they have the properties in common with genes that Dawkins, Hull and others 
ascribe to replicators? Again, the shared presupposition is that the biological domain 
(with genes in them) and the economic domain (with routines, or other units, in them) are 
distinct, mutually exclusive domains of reality. This is quite different if we look at 
routines from a metaphysical (third cluster) point of view (cf. Vromen 2006). Then the 
biological domain appears as part of the economic domain. Whether or not routines are 
similar to genes, all agree that if there are routines, their functioning involves the exercise 
by of certain skills of the individuals participating in the functioning of the routines, 
which in turn involves the existence and expression of certain genes in the individuals. 
 
All the issues at stake in the three clusters can be called ontological. Yet they are 
different in kind. We saw that the relation between the biological and the economic 
domain is cast in a different light in each cluster. In the first cluster, biological and 
economic evolution are considered as distinct processes. Properties of biological and of 
economic evolution are compared with each other. Do biological and economic evolution 
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have properties in common (and if so, what are these?), warranting a generic description 
of evolutionary processes? Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH both purport to 
provide such a generic description. Whether or not biological and economic evolution are 
connected with each, causally or otherwise, is not an issue here. This is clearly different 
in the second cluster. The issue of whether or not (and if so, how) biological and 
economic evolution are causally connected with each other takes centre stage here. Witt’s 
CH speaks out on this issue: antecedent processes of biological evolution not only set the 
stage for more recent processes of cultural evolution (including economic evolution), but 
still constrain and influence ongoing processes of economic evolution. The issue of how 
the biological and economic domain are connected is also central in the third cluster. But 
here the connection considered is not causal, but constitutive (or componential). The 
entities in the biological domain appear here as being at a lower level of organization 
than (and hence to be parts of) the entities in the economic domain. Economic evolution 
is seen as a multi-level phenomenon, including rather than excluding biological 
phenomena.   
 
 
Are GD and the CH rivals, complements, both, or what? 
 
We saw that Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD can be seen as a stance taken on an issue in the 
first cluster. Witt’s CH can be seen as a stance taken on an issue in the second cluster. 
Thus seen, Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH are not direct rivals of each other. 
The direct rival of Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD is Witt’s self-transformation view on 
evolution, not his CH. Yet, Witt and members of his group at Jena criticize Hodgson and 
Knudsen’s GD from the perspective of Witt’s CH and present Witt’s CH as a superior 
alternative to Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD. What sort of opposition is there (if any) 
between Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH? 
 
In Vromen (2004a) I argued that a particular stance taken on an issue in the one cluster 
typically does not commit one to take a particular stance on an issue in another cluster. 
Often there is independence between these. I suggested in particular that the CH and GD 
are compatible with each other. Contrary to what Witt et al. argue, acceptance of the CH 
need not imply the rejection of GD. The issue of whether there is one encompassing 
continuous causal chain leading to the evolution of human intelligence (belonging to 
cluster II), for example, seems to be orthogonal to the issue of whether the Darwinian 
triple is well-suited to grasp the dynamics of cultural systems (belonging to cluster I). 
Taking a stance on the first issue does not seem to prejudge the stance to be taken on the 
second issue. 
 
This seems to be precisely the stance that Hodgson and Knudsen take. Hodgson and 
Knudsen do not take issue with Witt’s CH. In this sense the debate between Hodgson and 
Knudsen and Witt et al. is asymmetrical. Whereas Witt et al. criticize Hodgson and 
Knudsen’s GD, Hodgson and Knudsen do not criticize Witt’s CH. In fact, Hodgson 
(2002, 2004) himself endorses a Darwinian doctrine of continuity.16 This doctrine implies 
                                                 
16 Hodgson (2002) suggests that Darwinian ontology is related to Darwin’s unflinching commitment to 
causal explanation rather than to Darwin’s three principles of evolution through natural selection. 
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among other things that intentionality cannot be an uncaused cause. Hodgson argues that 
Darwinism implies that intentionality is caused in antecedent evolutionary processes. 
Intentionality can be called a proximate cause of human behavior; a cause that itself in 
turn is produced by an ultimate cause such as natural selection (Mayr 1961). Hodgson’s 
doctrine of continuity resembles Witt’s CH in that both take as their starting-point the 
view that whatever exists is the product of antecedent evolutionary processes, either 
biological ones, cultural ones or a combination of both. 
 
Hodgson seems to be right in arguing that the latter view does not rule out that ongoing 
cultural (and in particular economic) processes can be explained accurately with the 
Darwinian principles variation, replication and selection. In particular, the capacity to act 
intentionally that supposedly plays a large role in cultural evolution does not necessarily 
invalidate the applicability of the three Darwinian principles. Indeed, as many have 
argued (cf. Hull et al. 2001), certain forms of human learning can be analyzed with the 
three principles at an abstract and general level. Sometimes Witt seems to suggest not 
only that the three principles are applicable only to biological evolution, but also that the 
products of biological evolution are limited to genetically programmed behavior (thereby 
ruling out more sophisticated forms of intentional action). To Hodgson and other 
proponents of GD this is question-begging. This is exactly what they deny. The whole 
point of GD is that the applicability of the three Darwinian principles is not limited to 
biological evolution and to genetically programmed behavior. 
 
Yet, it would be premature to conclude that Witt’s CH and Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD 
are compatible. On closer inspection Witt’s CH turns out to be richer, or more substantive 
in terms of ontology than Hodgson’s doctrine of continuity. Hodgson’s doctrine of 
continuity only involves the commitment to the idea that all causes acting now are the 
effects of causes acting previously. Witt’s CH involves more than this. What Witt adds to 
this in his CH is the hypothesis that the genetic material that antecedent processes of 
biological evolution endowed us with has remained pretty much the same since processes 
of cultural evolution started long time ago. Witt furthermore argues that the specific 
cognitive and behavioral repertoire based on this genetic material has given rise to a 
dynamics of cultural evolution that is distinctly non-Darwinian. As Cordes puts it, 
“Darwinian theories of evolution are suited to explain the natural origins of, for example, 
human learning, intentionality and deliberative behavior, but they are ill-suited to grasp 
the dynamics of cultural evolution that is based on these evolved cognitive capabilities.” 
(Cordes 2006, 539). The claim of Witt et al. is that antecedent Darwinian processes of 
biological evolution produced cognitive and behavioral dispositions in humans that paved 
the way for recent and ongoing non-Darwinian processes of cultural evolution to take off. 
 
Witt argues among other things that our evolved cognitive and behavioral dispositions 
enable us to anticipate future (possibly disastrous) selection effects and to devise 
strategies to forestall them. Thus unlike Darwinian biological evolution, in which 
mechanisms for creating new variation and mechanisms for selection are assumed to 
work independently of each other, cultural evolution is characterized by systematic 
feedbacks between selection and variation. Likewise, Witt (2003) argues that the 
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Darwinian assumption of “blindness” or “randomness” in the processes of variation does 
not do justice to human intuition and creativity in cultural evolution. 
 
Cordes (2006) spells out in detail many more differences between biological and 
economic evolution. Cordes argues that the notions of replication and of replicator are 
especially problematic in the economic domain. There simply are no credible examples 
of replicators in the economic domain (and the same holds for generations and lineages). 
Furthermore, perfectly in line with the CH and also with Boyd and Richerson’s work on 
cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Richerson and Boyd 2005), Cordes argues 
that social transmission in cultural evolution is biased by a host of biologically pre-
evolved cognitive dispositions. Hence, high-fidelity copying, which is at the heart of the 
notion of replication, is the exception rather than the rule in cultural evolution. 
Biologically pre-evolved psychological mechanisms also play an important role in 
cultural selection. They might underlie the choice of whom to imitate, for example. Boyd 
and Richerson suggest that conformist and prestige-based biases in imitators (and, more 
generally, social learners) play a key role here. 
 
Cordes seems to be right in arguing that especially the notions of replication and 
replicator do not fit cultural and economic evolution very well. As Hull himself argues, 
“Replication is inherently a copying process. Successive variations must in some sense be 
retained and then passed on”  (Hull et al. 2001, 514). There is quite some evidence 
mounted suggesting that the notion of copying captures not even approximately what is 
going on in social learning and social transmission. The socially learning individual (or 
the receiver of cultural information) often has a specific interest in what he wants to 
learn; an interest that often differs from the senders of cultural information (teachers, 
e.g.). And even in cases in which the interests of senders and receivers coincide and in 
which the receiver (or learner) has an interest in making faithful copies, the fidelity in 
social transmission is often severely compromised by pre-evolved psychological 
mechanisms (Sperber 1996, 2000; Wimsatt 1999; Sterelny 2006). Note that Sperber’s 
insights seem to be congenial to especially Cordes’s views on the implications of Witt’s 
CH. 
 
Hodgson and Knudsen take over Nelson and Winter’s (1982) suggestion that routines of 
firms are similar to the genes of organisms. Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) take this to 
mean that routines are similar to genes in the sense that both are replicators. With their 
routines as genes analogy, Nelson and Winter never wanted to suggest that routines are as 
faithfully copied by firms as genes are inherited by offspring, however. Nelson and 
Winter do not deny that firms sometimes engage in attempts to imitate routines of 
successful other firms. But they stress that these attempts are bound to lead to mutations 
rather than to faithful copies (see also Winter and Szulanski 2001). What Nelson and 
Winter really wanted to establish with their routines as genes analogy is that just like 
genes routines tend to be long-lived rather than short-lived:  
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While Winter and I (1982) referred to organizational routines as like the genes of 
an organization, what we largely meant was that they were what gave constancy 
and durability to organizational behavior, not that they were easily transferable to, 
or replicable by, other organizations. 
(Nelson 2007, 90) 
 
Nelson and Winter argue that once routines emerge in firms they tend to be stable and 
robust.17 Routines tend to survive personnel turnover and sometimes even survive 
deliberate attempts by top management to change them. 
 
Thus the notions of replication and replicator seem to be ill-suited to do justice to 
economic evolution. Hodgson and Knudsen’s decision to give more substance to their 
Darwinian triple by requiring that replicators and interactors are to be identified is all the 
more remarkable given that there does not seem to be a compelling conceptual or 
theoretical reason to require this. Godfrey-Smith (2000) argues convincingly that 
replicators are not essential for evolution through natural selection to occur. There can be 
evolution by natural selection without entities that satisfy Hull’s definition of ‘replicator’. 
It is enough for evolution through natural selection to occur if offspring resemble (in the 
relevant respects) their parents more than other organisms in the population. 
 
 
Interdependencies between stances taken on issues in different clusters 
 
It now seems that even though Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH are stances 
taken on different issues, they do bear upon each other after all. Pre-evolved 
psychological mechanisms bias processes of cultural and economic evolution in such a 
way and to such a degree that Hodgson and Knudsen’s notions of replication and 
replicator do not fit cultural and economic evolution. This shows that there can be 
interdependencies rather than independencies between stances taken on issues in different 
clusters. 
 
Another example of such an interdependency is provided by the so-called major 
transitions in evolution (Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995; Michod 1999). Many take 
the existence of several layers or levels of organization in reality stipulated in the layered 
ontology (cluster III)  simply for granted. But it has not always been like that. In 
evolutionary time, higher levels of organization emerged only recently. It took major 
transitions for higher levels to evolve. Solitary replicators first had to coalesce into 
networks of replicators enclosed in compartments. Subsequently unlinked genes had to 
evolve into chromosomes. Next prokaryotic cells had to give way to eukaryotic cells, 
single-celled organisms had to be transformed into multi-celled organisms until finally 
colonies arrived on the scene. According to Maynard Smith and Szathmary this is how 
new levels of organization have come into being. After each transition, entities that were 
capable of independent replication before the transition can replicate only as part of a 
                                                 
17 This suggests that Campbell’s (1965) ‘retention’ is befitting economic evolution better than ‘replication’. 
Retention also seems to fit Vanberg’s (2002) ‘program-based explanation’ better than replication. See also 
Stoelhorst and Hensgens (2007). 
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larger whole. They leave open the possibility that other major transitions are yet to occur 
and that other major transitions in fact already occurred. 
 
In terms of my three clusters of ontological issues, major evolutionary transitions belong 
to cluster II. Hypotheses about what major evolutionary transmissions already took place 
have implications for stances that can consistently be taken on issues in cluster III. Only 
those levels of organization can be considered to be part of the layered ontology that 
evolved after a major transition. 
 
As Okasha (2006) points out, major transitions also have consequences for how we think 
about group selection and, more generally, about multi-level selection. Okasha makes a 
useful distinction between two different conceptions of group selection. One conception 
is derived strictly analogously to individual selection. Lewontin’s (1970) characterization 
of evolution through natural selection in terms of the three principles phenotypic 
difference, differential fitness and heritability is transposed to the group level. Groups 
must satisfy the three principles for group selection to occur. This means in particular that 
collective group fitness is measured in the (expected) number of offspring groups that the 
groups in some population leave. One would perhaps expect that this conception of group 
selection, which is strictly analogous to individual selection, would dominate the 
discussion. But this is not the case. The conception of group selection dominating the 
discussion is the one that is revitalized by Sober and Wilson (1998). In Sober and 
Wilson’s conception, the collective fitness of groups is not measured in terms of the 
(expected) number of their “offspring” groups, but as the aggregate fitness of their 
constituent particles (i.e., the individuals in them). Groups are not treated as Darwinian 
units in their own right, but as parts of the environments for the individuals in them. 
Sober and Wilson’s conception of group selection can be epitomized as “population 
structure matters”. The way in which populations are partitioned in groups (defined 
minimally in interactional terms as sets of individuals that interact at least once, where 
the interactions must have fitness consequences for the individuals) partly determines 
what evolves. 
 
Okasha suggests that for major transitions to get off the ground there must be group 
selection in the second sense. For groups to emerge as a genuine collective,18 competition 
between their parts must be suppressed. This can only happen if populations have the 
right structure. But once groups have emerged as cohesive and integrated wholes, group 
selection of the first kind comes into play. Although it might be a bit farfetched and 
premature to try to draw conclusions from Okasha’s insightful discussion for our thinking 
about multi-level selection in economic systems, it seems that firms often do display the 
degree of cohesiveness and integration that is needed to get group selection in Okasha’s 
first, substantive sense started. Hodgson and Knudsen seem to be right that firms often 
are interactors in Hull’s sense. This implies that economic evolution is multi-level, with 
firm selection being similar to Okasha’s group selection in the first sense. But it took 
something group selection in the second Sober and Wilson type for firms to evolve as 
interactors. 
 
                                                 
18 Note that this involves a more substantive notion of a group than Sober and Wilson’s. 
18
  #0805 
 
 
 
Are GD and the CH compatible after all? 
 
Let us now return to the debate between Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH. We 
just concluded that Witt and Cordes seem to be right in arguing that Witt’s CH, which is 
ontologically speaking richer than Hodgson’s doctrine of continuity, implies that 
Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD does not fit economic evolution. How do Hodgson and 
Knudsen respond to this? One might expect Hodgson and Knudsen to reply that what 
Witt adds to Hodgson’s doctrine of continuity (which, we saw, is compatible with 
Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD) is mistaken. And indeed, Hodgson and Knudsen do seem to 
have reservations about Witt et al.’s hypothesis that allegedly unchanging products of 
antecedent biological evolution still have a large causal impact on ongoing economic 
evolution. The overall thrust of their response is not to deny the differences that Witt et 
al. observe between economic and biological evolution, however. They argue instead that 
these differences do not impair the usefulness (and , indeed, even the necessity) of 
invoking the three Darwinian principles in explanations of processes of economic 
evolution. 
 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly Hodgson and Knudsen subscribe to many, if not all the 
differences between biological and economic evolution that Witt et al. identify. They 
furthermore agree that the differences are significant. They recognize that intentionality, 
intelligence and learning processes, which are mostly absent in biological evolution, play 
an important role in economic evolution. Hodgson and Knudsen (2008) also note that 
replication in economic evolution is quite unlike replication in biological evolution. 
Replication in biological evolution is direct, while replication in economic evolution is 
indirect and inferential (i.e., it works via the observation of the behavioral consequences 
of replicators). Hodgson and Knudsen also agree that social transmission has lower 
fidelity than genetic inheritance. Yet they maintain that all these differences do not 
invalidate the use of their Darwinian triple. They argue that all these differences are 
differences in details that are irrelevant for assessing the suitability of the (allegedly) 
domain-unspecific Darwinian principles (Hodgson 2007). The differences only become 
relevant if one adds domain-specific to the (alleged) domain-unspecific Darwinian 
principles to arrive at full-fledged explanatory theories and explanations in biology and 
economics, respectively. 
 
Thus in their interpretation of the three Darwinian principles, Hodgson and Knudsen are 
trying to get rid of many connotations that are commonly attributed to the principles. This 
they do to accommodate the many significant differences between biological and 
economic evolution. In their attempt to show that the principles are truly domain-general, 
they are driven to rather extreme levels of abstraction. The price they have to pay for this, 
however, is (as Cordes 2007 correctly notes) that the principles are emptied from 
virtually all of their content. It is hard to see how principles that are practically devoid of 
any content could give much guidance in the construction of full-fledged domain-specific 
theories and explanations (Vromen 2007). Almost all the substance that is needed to 
arrive at full-fledged causal explanations of concrete processes of economic evolution 
must come from elsewhere and the three principles are not of much help in finding or 
constructing this domain-specific substance.  
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Summing up now, in the foregoing discussion three stages can be been distinguished with 
respect to the issue of whether Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH are 
compatible with each other. In the first stage, we saw that Hodgson is right that his GD 
and his doctrine of continuity are compatible. If continuity means nothing more than that 
every proximate cause is the effect of an ultimate cause, then continuity does not rule out 
the possibility that the three Darwinian principles are well-suited to explain ongoing 
cultural evolution. We also saw that Witt’s CH entails a richer ontology than Hodgson’s 
doctrine of continuity, however. What Witt adds to Hodgson’s doctrine of continuity is 
the hypothesis that antecedent processes of biological evolution have endowed humans 
with a cognitive and behavioral repertoire that makes cultural evolution significantly 
different than biological evolution. Indeed, these differences are so vast that the 
Darwinian principles (replication, in particular) seem to be ill-suited to explain cultural 
evolution. Thus in this second stage Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH appear 
to be incompatible. Yet in the third and final stage we saw that Hodgson and Knudsen 
agree with the differences between biological and cultural evolution that Witt et al. 
identify on the basis of Witt’s CH. Accordingly, in their interpretation of the three 
Darwinian principles, Hodgson and Knudsen are prepared to dispense with connotations 
that are commonly associated with the principles but that they agree do not fit the 
economic domain. What is left is an even further watered-down version of GD that is 
compatible with Witt’s CH. 
 
 
Other possible uses of Darwinism 
 
Where does this leave us? It is not just that as a result Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD is 
virtually devoid of content. It is also possible that in the end the same causal-etiological 
explanations are arrived at, whether we start from Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD or from 
Witt’s CH. This also calls into question that as research programs they provide different 
heuristics. Above I argued that Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH are rivals in 
the sense that they steer further research in different directions. Hodgson and Knudsen’s 
GD spurs researchers to do further investigations into how processes of interaction (with 
firms as examples of interactors in the economic domain) and of replication (with 
routines and habits as examples of replicators in the economic domain) interact to 
produce processes of economic evolution. Witt’s CH invites researchers to look more 
closely into how ongoing processes of economic evolution build upon and are still 
constrained and causally affected by the products of antecedent processes of biological 
evolution. But this was based on the assumption that the three principles and notions such 
as interactors and replicators retain their original connotations. Now that we have seen 
that Hodgson and Knudsen get rid of many of their original connotations, it is no longer 
clear whether their GD gives any direction to future research at all. All the content should 
come from domain-specific data and hypotheses and the watered-down principles and 
notions are not very useful in gathering the domain-specific data and in constructing the 
hypotheses. 
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It seems Witt’s CH fares better in this respect. Witt’s CH seems to give more direction to 
future research efforts than Hodgson and Knudsen’s watered-down GD. The professed 
final aim of both Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH is to arrive at causal 
explanations of actual concrete evolutionary processes in the economy. Witt’s CH gives 
more guidance to how to reach this aim than Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD. Witt’s CH 
specifies innate wants and non-cognitive learning mechanisms on the basis of which 
people are assumed to build learned or acquired wants, for example. But here it is left 
unclear how these substantive hypotheses about the cognitive and behavioral repertoire of 
human beings follow from or are explained by Darwinian theories of evolution. It is 
unclear how much work is done by Darwinian evolutionary theorizing in either 
identifying or explaining the human repertoire. In their attempt to specify the cognitive 
and behavioral repertoire of human beings, Witt and his group members draw on many 
sources (in social psychology, for example). They argue that Darwinian evolutionary 
theory is well-suited to explain ancient processes of biological evolution in which human 
learning, intentionality and deliberative behavior evolved. But they do not provide such 
explanations. Nor do they provide references to work of others in which such Darwinian 
explanations are given. That Darwinian evolutionary theory is able to explain these 
human cognitive capacities and dispositions is a promissory note rather than something 
that is actually shown. 
 
This leaves us wondering what contributions Darwinism does have or could make to 
evolutionary economics. Both camps put their cards on the guidance that Darwinism 
could give to constructing full-fledged causal theories, either about ancient processes of 
biological evolution, of ongoing processes of economic evolution, or of both. But both 
camps have been found to be lacking in this respect. This forces us to further reflect on 
what contribution Darwinism could possibly make to evolutionary economics. I want to 
finish this paper by briefly outlining two other possible roles that Darwinism could play 
in evolutionary economics. 
 
Darwinian evolutionary theory could help in seeing common patterns in already existing 
explanations, both inside and outside of evolutionary economics. What Darwinism then 
contributes would be an increased unification, integration and systematization of work 
already done in evolutionary economics and other fields of enquiry.19 What would be 
gained is increased simplicity and coherence (Hull 1988, 402; see also Hull et al. 2001, 
527). Darwinism could help in organizing discussions by giving them more theoretical 
structure (Nelson 2006). Thus Darwinism could also help in constructing bridges between 
various behavioral disciplines and in making them more compatible (Gintis 2007). In 
doing so, it would facilitate cross-disciplinary work and also enhance the Darwinian 
movement (Mesoudi et al. 2006, 346-347). 
 
All this, I submit, gets close to what Kitcher (1993) has in mind with explanatory 
unification. Kitcher argues that Darwin’s three principles provide a paradigmatic example 
of a general explanatory pattern (or schema) that has been enormously successful in 
unifying seemingly disparate phenomena. Darwin’s principles unify the phenomena by 
showing that they are all instantiations of the same general explanatory pattern. The more 
                                                 
19 Hodgson and Knudsen seem to also hint at this when they call Darwinian theory a metatheory.  
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phenomena we can show to be instantiations of the same general pattern and the fewer 
the principles in the explanatory pattern, the greater the explanatory power of the pattern. 
Kitcher contrasts his notion of unification-as-explanation with causal-etiological 
explanation,20 the sort of explanation that Hodgson, Knudsen and Witt think Darwinism 
should be conducive to. 
 
Another possible use to which Darwinism can be put is to construct hypotheses about 
end-product of evolutionary processes. More specifically, Darwinism can be helpful in 
generating hypotheses about specific cognitive capacities, dispositions and heuristics. 
This is how Darwinism is actually used in for example evolutionary psychology 
(Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow 1992). Evolutionary psychology identifies specific 
evolutionary problems and pressures that our ancestors were confronted with in the so-
called Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness and then formulates hypotheses about 
specialized mental modules (or psychological mechanisms) in the human mind that 
supposedly evolved to solve them. Subsequently the hypotheses are put to empirical tests. 
There is a similar tradition in economics, starting with Becker (1976), that uses 
Darwinism to construct hypotheses about what basic preferences we have (see, for 
example, also Guth and Yaari 1991, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). More recently, 
neuroeconomists started to take recourse to Darwinism to formulate hypotheses about the 
computations and firing rates of groups of neurons (Glimcher 2003, Ross 2005). 
 
At first sight, this might resemble the use to which Witt wants Darwinism to be put. Witt 
(2007) takes the fact that evolutionary economists regard new developments in 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science as a hopeful sign that there is support in 
the evolutionary economics community for his own CH rather than for Hodgson and 
Knudsen’s GD. But it seems that Witt sees the role of Darwinism as limited to explaining 
already and independently identified cognitive dispositions. By contrast, the theoretical 
movements just alluded to want to use Darwinism as an engine to find out about the 
cognitive machinery of human beings. Furthermore, the specific sorts of cognitive 
dispositions that Witt ascribes to human beings might not be supported by Darwinism-as-
an-engine for constructing hypotheses about the human mind and brain. Sometimes it 
seems Witt still works with traditional dichotomies (wants and dispositions are either 
innate and genetically encoded or are learned or culturally acquired) that evolutionary 
psychology wants to overcome (Cosmides and Tooby 1992), for example. 
 
In perhaps the most sustained attempt to see what implications Darwinism has for how 
the human cognitive machinery looks like to date, Sterelny (2003) argues that “… we 
have evolved wiring-and-connection features that are something like, but not perfectly 
like, beliefs and preferences as portrayed by intentional psychology” (10). We have 
evolved separate systems for representing preferences and beliefs, Sterelny argues, that 
are more sophisticated than just physiological drives or instincts and specific 
environmental triggers respectively. Furthermore, the connections between the two 
systems are not fixed but flexible. Beliefs do not directly code for specific behaviour, for 
example. This seems to come close to how decision theory depicts human behaviour. But 
                                                 
20 But see Darden and Cain (1989) and Skipper (1999) for a counter-argument that Darwin’s principles are 
used in Darwinism to construct causal-mechanistic explanations. 
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Sterelny does not believe that decision theory is vindicated. What he takes from various 
experimental findings is that our motivations are not stable across different contexts 
(Sterelny 2004, 516-517). Decision theory is not able to account for this rather radical 
form of context-sensitivity. It is not clear whether the views on the human cognitive 
machinery of Witt and his group members can accommodate the great context-sensitivity 
of human motivations observed and explained by Sterelny. 
 
In short, the use that Hodgson and Knudsen and Witt et al. want to put Darwinism to, 
namely to use Darwinism as a point of departure for constructing causal-etiological 
explanations of economic evolutionary processes, is not the only use to which Darwinism 
might be put. What is more, there might be other uses to which Darwinism might be more 
profitably put. One such use is to use the three Darwinian principles to unify and 
integrate already existing explanations in various fields. Another use is to use Darwinism 
to construct new hypotheses about various parts of the human cognitive machinery.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In the debate between Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH, the two positions are 
often regarded as rivals. It was argued that several sorts of ontological issues are at stake 
in the debate. One is about the properties that biological and economic evolution have in 
common. Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD asserts that the Darwinian principles of variation, 
replication and selection aptly capture properties that biological and economic evolution 
share with each other. Witt and his Group members disagree. They argue that the 
Darwinian principles only fit the domain-specific properties of biological evolution. 
Their argument that the Darwinian principles do not fit economic evolution is based on 
Witt’s CH. Yet, strictly speaking, Witt’s CH addresses an ontological issue of a different 
sort than Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD, namely how biological and economic evolution 
are causally connected. This issue is orthogonal to the issue of whether biological and 
economic evolution have common properties that is addressed by Hodgson and 
Knudsen’s GD. Strictly speaking, the alternative to Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD that Witt 
puts forward is not his CH, but his generic view on evolutionary systems as self-
transforming systems. 
 
Once we realize that Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and Witt’s CH are not directly rivaling 
each other, the issue pops up how then we should think of the relation between them. Are 
they rivals nonetheless, are they rather compatible with each other or what? Witt and his 
group members argue that they are rivals nonetheless, while Hodgson and Knudsen 
believe that they are compatible. It was argued that the critical issue here is how much 
ontological substance and content is given to both Hodgson and Knudsen’s GD and 
Witt’s CH. If Witt’s CH is taken to assert only that all the human cognitive capacities and 
dispositions at work in ongoing economic evolution are products of prior evolutionary 
processes, as Hodgson’s own doctrine of continuity asserts, then Hodgson and Knudsen 
are right that their GD and Witt’s CH are compatible. Witt and his group members argue 
that Witt’s CH involves more than this, however. They argue that prior processes of 
biological evolution have endowed us humans with specific cognitive capacities and 
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dispositions. These capacities and dispositions are argued to have given rise to a specific 
dynamics in economic evolution for which in particular Darwinian notions such as 
replication (and replicators) and selection are ill-suited. Hodgson and Knudsen do not 
counter this critique by dismissing the extra substance that Witt’s CH adds to Hodgson’s 
own doctrine of continuity, but by diminishing the ontological substance of their own 
GD. They purge the three Darwinian principles from several connotations that are 
commonly associated with the principles. This enables Hodgson and Knudsen to rescue 
their claim that their own GD and Witt’s CH are compatible. But the price they have to 
pay for this is that it leaves their Darwinian principles with virtually no content. 
 
The discussion culminated in a discussion of how useful the three Darwinian principles 
of variation, replication and selection can be for studying economic evolution. It is clear 
that if practically all the substance is removed from the principles, they are not of much 
help in collecting the substance that needs to be added to them in order to produce 
domain-specific causal explanations. Witt’s hypotheses about the specific cognitive 
capacities and dispositions that natural selection allegedly has equipped us with seem to 
fare better in this respect. But here the problem is that Witt and his group members fail to 
make clear how these hypotheses are informed by Darwinism. Here again it is doubtful 
that Darwinism contributes a lot to studying economic evolution. The paper ended with a 
few suggestions about alternative uses to which Darwinism can be put in evolutionary 
economics. 
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